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REFLECTIONS ON CRIMINAL JURISDICTION IN
INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF
CULTURAL PROPERTY
M. Cherif Bassiouni *
I. INTRODUCTION

Questions of jurisdiction concerning protection of cultural
property 1 are marginally addressed in conventions relative to the
international protection of cultural property since only the territoriality theory is relied upon either explicitly or implicitly in the
various relevant texts. 2 The 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea,3
* Professor of Law, DePaul University; Secretary-General, International Association of Penal Law; Dean, International Institute of Higher Studies in Criminal Sciences. J .D.
(Indiana, 1964); LL.M. (John Marshall, 1966); S.J.D. (George Washington, 1973).
1. The term "cultural property" is used herein as defined in the UNESCO Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and Transfer
of Ownership of Cultural Property, Nov. 14, 1970, art. l, reprinted in 10 l.L.M. 289 (1971)
[hereinafter cited as UNESCO Convention].
2. None of the major international agreements concerned solely with protection of
cultural property contain detailed, explicit statements regarding jurisdiction. However, a
reliance on the territorial theory of jurisdiction may be found in or inferred from the provisions of these relevant conventions: Treaty on the Protection of Artistic and Scientific Institutions and Historic Monuments, Apr. 15, 1935, 49 Stat. 3267, T.S. No. 899, 167 L.N.T.S.
289 [hereinafter cited as Roerich Pact]; Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property
in the Event of Armed Conflict, May 14, 1954, 249 U.N.T.S. 215 [hereinafter cited as 1954
Hague Convention]; European Cultural Convention, Dec. 19, 1954, 218 U.N.T.S. 139
[hereinafter cited as European Cultural Convention]; European Convention on the Protection of the Archaeological Heritage, May 6, 1969, 66 Europ. T.S. 736 [hereinafter cited as
European Archaeological Convention]; UNESCO Convention, supra note 1; Organization of
American States: Convention on the Protection of the Archaeological, Historical, and Artistic Heritage of the American Nations, OAS G.A. Res. 210 (Vl-0/76) (1976), reprinted in
15 l.L.M. 1350 (1976) [hereinafter cited as OAS Convention], Convention Concerning Protection of World Cultural Property and Natural Heritage, U.N. Doc. A!CONF. 48/PC/11/Add.
3, 15 (1972) [hereinafter cited as World Heritage Convention].
3. Convention on the Law of the Sea, opened for signature Dec. 10, 1982, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.62/122 (not yet in force), art. 303 [hereinafter cited as Convention on the Law of
the Sea]. Article 303 contains only a limited jurisdictional statement regarding the contiguous
zone defined in article 33. Removal of property from the contiguous zone without the consent of the coastal state is presumed to infringe upon that state's territory in violation of
article 3 of the convention. In limiting the scope of the article to the contiguous zone, the
Convention includes no rule governing property found beyond the zone. Also, paragraph
2 of article 303 limits the scope of a coastal state's jurisdiction over cultural property found
within the contiguous zone to prevent the removal of the property from the zone for the
purpose of controlling traffic in antiquities only. The question of jurisdiction over property
left in situ for study or other purposes is left unresolved. Paragraph 3 further limits article
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however, contains two clauses dealing with protection of cultural
property, including applicable theories of jurisdiction, 4 and what
may be deemed guidelines for resolving conflicts of jurisdiction. 5
Scholarly writings on the subject jurisdiction are also limited,
though the subject of international protection of cultural property
has been treated extensively and in depth. 6
Theories of jurisdiction, choice of law policies and rules, and
303 by excluding, from the scope of the article, property subject to the rights of identifiabl~
owners or the rules of admiralty. For a further discussion of the articles contained in the
Convention on the Law of the Sea relevant to protection of cultural property, see Note,
Archaeological and Historical Objects: The International Legal Implications of UNCLOS III,
22 VA.J. INT'L L. 777 (1982).Seealso, e.g., H. CRANE-MILLER, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND MARINE
ARCHAEOLOGY (1973) (examination of national and international maritime rights).
4. For the position of the United States, see RESTATEMENT OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS
OF THE UNITED STATES (Revised), (Tentative Draft No. l), considered by the ALI in June 1980,
reviewed in 74 AM. J. INT'L L. 954 (1980);Tentative Draft No. 2, considered by the ALI in May
1981, reviewed in 75 AM. J. INT'L L. 987 (1981); Tentative Draft No. 3, considered by the ALI
in May 1982, Part IV - Jurisdiction,§§ 401, 419-20, 431-33, reviewed in 76 AM. J. INT'L L. 655
(1982) [hereinafter cited as RESTATEMENT]. See also Harvard Draft Convention on Jurisdiction
with Respect to Crime, 29 AM. J. INT'L L. 437 (Supp. 1935) [hereinafter cited as Harvard Draft
Code]. For the writings of scholars on international law, see e.g., E. LAUTERPACHT, Qp.
PENHEIM: INTERNATIONAL LAW 43-79 (1952); 2 D.P. O'CONNELL, INTERNATIONAL LAW 665 (1965);
6 M. WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 1-253 (1968); W. BISHOP, INTERNATIONAL LAW
531-653 (3d ed. 1971); G. SCHWARTZENBERGER, INTERNATIONAL LAW 183-283 (1976) (for the
writings of scholars on international law). For international criminal law scholars, see, e.g.,
I M.C. BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION: UNITED STATES LAW AND PRACTICE, ch. VI
(1983) [hereinafter cited as EXTRADITION]. For a pioneer in the area of extraterritorial criminal
jurisdiction and conflicts of criminal jurisdiction, see H.F. DONNEDIEU DE VABRES, INTRODUCTION A L'ETUDE DU DROIT PENAL INTERNATIONAL (1922), H.F. DONNEDIEU DE VABRES, LES PRINCIPES MODERNES DU DROIT PENAL INTERNATIONAL (1928). See also Szaszy' Conflict ofLaws Rules
in International Criminal Law and Municipal Criminal Law in Western and Socialist Countries, in II M.C. BASSIOUNI & V.P. NANDA, A TREATISE ON INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 135
(1973); Sarkar, The Proper Law of Crime in International Law, 11 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 446
(1962) (examination of theories of jurisdiction for international criminal law).
5. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) ON THE CONFLICTS OF LAW§ 6 (1971). For contemporary
U.S. scholarly writings, see e.g., A. EHRENZWEIG, A TREATISE ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS (1962);
B. CURRIE, SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAW (1963); H. GOODRICH & E. SCALES, HANDBOOK OF THE CONFLICT OF LAW (1964); R. CAVERS, THE CHOICE-OF-LAW PROCESS (1965); A. LEFLAR,
AMERICAN CONFLICTS LAW (1968); W .L. REESE & M. ROSENBURG, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONFLICT OF LAWS (1978); R. WEINTRAUB, COMMENTARY ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS (1980)
(background, usage and commentaries on conflict of laws).
6. Cf ART LAW: DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL (L. DuBoff ed. 1975); L. DUBOFF, THE
DESKBOOK OF ART LAW (1977)[hereinafter cited as DESKBOOK]; Bator, An Essay on the International Trade in Art, 34 STAN. L. REV. 275 (1982); Comment, The UNESCO Convention on the
Illicit Movement of Art Treasures, 12 HARV. INT'L L.J. 537 (1971); Note, The Protection ofArt
in Transnational Law, 7 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 689 (1974); Nafziger, UNESCO-Centered
Management of International Conflict Over Cultural Property, 27 HASTINGS L.J.1051 (1976);
Nahlik, International Law and the Protection of Cultural Property in Armed Conflicts, 27
HASTINGS L.J. 1069 (1976); Merryman, A Course in Art and the Law, 26 J. LEGAL EDUC. 551
(1974). See also The Penal Protection of Works of Art (Proceedings of the International Institute of Higher Studies in Criminal Sciences, 1983).
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methods of resolving conflicts of jurisdiction are threshold issues
which should be addressed by the drafters of any international
convention 7 and, in particular, by the drafters of instruments concerning international protection of cultural property (due to the
transnational nature of the issues to which such instruments address themselves). Regrettably, the issue of jurisdiction in international agreements concerning protection of cultural property has
never been sufficiently addressed and, thus, deserves further
consideration.
The failure of any international agreement to adopt specific
theories of jurisdiction or to at least provide some policy or rules
regarding conflicts of jurisdiction creates problems with respect
to the dual jurisdictional questions of legislation and enforcement.
Ultimately, the recognition of foreign judicial judgments is questioned. The very nature of international protection of cultural property further compounds the problems where an international agreement does not contain explicit jurisdictional provisions.8 This arises
7. See M.C. BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW: A DRAFT INTERNATIONAL CODE
145 (1980) (theories of jurisdiction applicable to international crimes are discussed in article
III of the Enforcement Part) [hereinafter referred to as DRAFT INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
CODE]. The Code was presented at the Vlth U.N. Congress on Crime Prevention and the Treatment of Offenders, (Caracas, Venezuela, 1980) U.N. Doc. E/1980/L.1. For commentaries on
the Draft International Criminal Code, see 52 REVUE INTERNATIONALE DE DROIT PENAL, No.
3-4 (1981).
8. The complex jurisdictional problems often encountered in an action at law to protect cultural property may be illustrated by Union of India v. Norton Simon Foundation.
In 1951, the Swapuran Nataraja, a 10th century bronze representation of the Lord Shiva
as Lord of the Cosmic Dance, was excavated in India. By the laws of India, this bronze is
a legal entity capable of owning property, suing, and being sued. The image, while being
restored in 1956, was stolen and a copy substituted in its place. In 1967, the Nataraja came
into the possession of a Bombay art collector and was displayed by him.
Several years later, the statue was exported to the United States and sold by Ben Heller,
a noted art dealer, to the Norton Simon Foundation. An export permit for "a 10th or 11th
century dancing shiva" was obtained when the bronze left India. In 1973, the Nataraja was
loaned to the Metropolitan Museum of Art for an exhibit. The Metropolitan notified the
government of India of its plan to exhibit the piece. Due to the protests of the Indian government and the intervention of the Department of State, the Metropolitan agreed not to exhibit
the idol.
In late 1974, India filed suit in England, New York (Ben Heller's domicile), and Los
Angeles (the domicile of Norton Simon and the Norton Simon Foundation). Criminal proceedings were instituted against the original conservateur and his several accomplices. The
complaint alleged a conspiracy to steal the Nataraja and traced the statue's path from the
alleged theft to its sale to Norton Simon. India demanded return of the bronze, $500,000
damages for intentional infliction of mental suffering, $1 million in punitive damages, and
costs incurred in locating the idol and litigating its return. Damages of $4 million were
demanded in the event the Nataraja was not returned.
The Norton Simon Foundation denied that India had either title or rights to the im-
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essentially because relevant international instruments either
distinguish or blur the distinction between the contexts of war and
peace, and the spectrum between war and peace (involving different
levels of hostility). Some treaties are applicable only during times
of armed conflict; 9 others are applicable during times of peace but
also contain provisions regarding periods of belligerent occupation; 10
still others do not specifically state that they apply exclusively
during times of peace, although such exclusivity may be inferred, 11
and others apply in time of both war and peace. 12 Rules governing
jurisdiction and policies affecting choice of law differ significantly
age. The defendants argued that the plaintiffs should be denied relief by the doctrines of
unclean hands, in pari delicto, waiver, and estoppel. With reference to the theft of the
Nataraja, the defendants argued that India should be estopped from recovery by their own
inaction. Defendants further argued that plaintiffs knew or should have known of the bronze's
whereabouts since 1965 when it was displayed openly and notoriously in Bombay. Therefore,
by virtue of English, Indian, New York, and California statutes of limitation, India had abandoned title to the object.
The defendants also argued that laches barred the suit because India had failed to take
action to recover the Nataraja within a reasonable time after it was put on notice of the
object's location. Norton Simon had purchased the object in reliance on this non-action and,
therefore, plaintiffs should be equitably estopped from bringing suit. Finally, defendants
alleged that the laws of India, if construed in the manner urged by the plaintiffs, were contrary to United States public policy and not applicable in an American court. See Union
of India v. Norton Simon Foundation, No. 74 Civ. 5331. (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (second amended
complaint); No. CV 74-3581-RJK. (C.D.Cal. 1976).
The case was eventually settled out of court. See No. CV 74-3581-RJK, Stipulation and
Order (C.D. Cal. 1976). Plaintiffs obtained a document quit-claiming all the defendants' right,
title and interest in and to the Nataraja. In exchange, India permitted the object to remain
in the possession of the foundation for ten years and to be exhibited in any country with
which India had diplomatic relations. As a result of Norton Simon and the foundation's right
to counterclaim against Ben Heller, the art dealer conveyed numerous art works and a sum
of money to the foundation.
For a more detailed discussion of this case, see DESKBOOK, supra note 6, at 109-14.
9. Geneva Convention (IV) Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of
War, done Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, T.l.A.S. No. 3365, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 (effective Feb.
2, 1956) [hereinafter cited as 1949 Geneva Convention (IV)]; Protocol I Additional to the Geneva
Convention of Aug. 12, 1949, adopted June 8, 1977 by the Diplomatic Conference on Reaffirmation of Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts, opened for signature Dec. 12,
1977, U.N. Doc. A/32/144 Annex I of Aug. 15, 1977, reprinted in 15 I.L.M. 1391 (1977)
[hereinafter cited as Protocol I]; Protocol II Additional to the Geneva Conventions of Aug.
12, 1949, adopted June 8, 1977, by .the Diplomatic Conference on Reaffirmation of Humanitarian
Law Applicable in Armed Conflict, opened for signature Dec. 12, 1977, U.N. Doc. A/32/144
Annex II of Aug. 15, 1977, reprinted in 16 I.L.M. 1391 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Protocol II].
10. 1954 Hague Convention, supra note 2, art. 5; UNESCO Convention, supra note
1, art. 11.
11. European Cultural Convention, supra note 2; European Archaeological Convention, supra note 2; OAS Convention, supra note 2.
12. Roerich Pact, supra note 2, art. 1.
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depending on a peacetime or a wartime context. The absence of
differentiated specificity in relevant international instruments as
to contextual application, applicable rules of law, and choice of law
policies and rules deprives the area of international protection of
cultural property of much needed clarity, uniformity, and certainty
of outcome.
International protection of cultural property, whether applicable to the context of armed conflict or peace, is achieved
through two means. The first is criminal in nature and involves the
prohibition, prosecution, and punishment of destruction of cultural
property, pillage, and theft. The second is civil in nature and involves the restitution of cultural property to rightful owners who
may be either states, individuals, or legal entities. Policies and rules
governing jurisdiction and choice of law necessarily differ with
respect to criminal prosecution and civil action. Consequently, the
relevant international conventions should distinguish in their appropriate provisions between these two kinds of legal action applicable to the protection of cultural property. Such provisions would
serve the interests of clarity, uniformity, certainty, and predictability of outcome, as well as effective enforcement, regardless of
the forum deemed competent to adjudicate such actions.
It must also be noted that another jurisdictionally-related problem arises from the fact that the international legislator has not
consistently expressed the legal nature of violations of international
protection of cultural property. In the context of armed conflicts,
certain violations are war crimes, and are thus international crimes
subject to universal jurisdiction, as well as territorial jurisdiction
as discussed below. In the context of peace, there is no indication
from the international legislator as to whether certain violations
can also be deemed international crimes. Furthermore, neither the
nature of the violation (i.e., an international crime, a transnational
crime, or a common crime)13 nor the appropriate applicable jurisdictional theory is identified (e.g., universality and territoriality for
international crimes, active or passive personality and protected
interest, territoriality for transnational crimes, and any or all of
the above for common crimes).
International protection of cultural property in the context of
the regulation of armed conflicts, as stated above, makes violation

RES.

13. Bassiouni, The Common Characteristics of International Criminal Law, 15
INT'L L. 25 (1983).

CASE

W.

J.
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of the defined prohibited conduct a war crime, thus an international
crime, to which universality and territoriality of jurisdiction apply.
The competent forum is therefore either an international criminal
court, should one be established (even on an ad hoc basis), or national
military tribunals, which compound jurisdictional problems with
respect to civilians who may not be subject to its general
jurisdiction. 14 As an international crime, it would entail the applicability of the doctrine aut dedere aut J'udicare which implies the
duty to prosecute or extradite, the duty of states to lend judicial
assistance and cooperation in the investigation, prosecution, punishment, and, in general, the enforcement of these aspects. 15 All these
measures do not apply to non-international crimes, unless specifically established by conventional or customary international criminal
law. Thus, the provisions of the relevant conventions are applicable
in peacetime, unless the prohibitions in question are deemed to be
in the nature of international crimes. Otherwise they will be enforced by the ordinary courts of general jurisdiction of the interested states, whether they be criminal or civil, and are not likely
to benefit from the expanded scope and scheme of international enforcement including the broader jurisdictional bases recognized for
international crimes. 16
The lack of explicit jurisdictional provisions in conventions dealing with international protection of cultural property also raises
conflict of laws issues. As the primary conventions dealing with
international protection of cultural property contain no explicit
jurisdictional theories, states must resort to national rules governing jurisdiction and choice of law. Thus, which particular state may
assert jurisdiction or has priority of jurisdiction, and which body
of law should be applied to violations of international agreements
protecting cultural property, remains internationally unspecified.
This situation frustrates, inter alia, the cooperation between states
which is so necessary for the effective protection of cultural prop-

14. See U.C.M.J. arts. 1-6 and 16-21, 10 U.S.C. § 101, § 802 art. 2 (1982) and e.g., Reid
v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1956), and O'Callaghan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258 (1969); see also infra
note 178.
15. For the concept of aut dedere aut judicare, see I EXTRADITION, supra note 4, chap.
II, and Costello, International Terrorism and the Development of the Principle of "Aut Dedere
Aut Ju~icare," 10 J. INT'L L. & ECON. 483 (1975). The concept is predicated on Hugo Grotius'
maxim "aut dedere aut punire." See H. GROTIUS DE JURE BELLI AC PACIS, Book II, Chap. XX!,
§ 5(1) (1625).
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erty and, particularly, to the prevention and control of illicit traffic
in cultural property.
The ensuing analysis explores some of the problems created
by the absence of specific jurisdictional provisions in international
agreements protecting cultural property.

II. HISTORICAL EVOLUTION OF THE
PROTECTION OF CULTURAL PROPERTY
As stated above and discussed below, the applicable international conventions distinguish their contextual applicability either
explicitly or implicitly i.e., during armed conflicts (war), or at other
times (peace). The distinction is no longer helpful or useful because
the question concerns not the context, but the object of the
protection. 17 Since archaeological, national, historical, and other property of national and cultural heritage are the intended objects of
international protection, there is no conceptual difference in the
legal nature of the protection. The differences concern the types
of protective measures and sanctions which should apply, such as
those measures applicable to individuals acting in their private or
personal capacity, and those applicable to states and individuals
acting in their official capacity or pursuant to state-sponsored policy.
The applicable conventions do not make such distinctions, but reflect
the very questionable historical division of the international law
of war and peace. Consequently, it is necessary to analyze the relevant applicable international instruments in light of those
distinctions.
A.

PROTECTION OF CULTURAL PROPERTY DURING
PERIODS OF ARMED CONFLICT

The protection of cultural property during armed conflict has
evolved over the relatively short period of the last two centuries. 18

16. I EXTRADITION, supra note 4, chap. II and supra note 13.
17. Bassiouni, The Proscribing Function of International Criminal Law in the International Protection of Human Rights, YALE STUD. WORLD PUBLIC ORDER (1983).
18. For centuries, the laws of war allowed belligerents to confiscate or destroy all

enemy property, public or private. The ancient Romans originated the concept of "booty."
Booty was property confiscated in accordance with the international rules of war and was
"a legitimate by-product of war." DESKBOOK, supra note 6, at 129. See also TRUEUE, ART
PLUNDER (1961). On the regulation of armed conflicts and relative conventions, see D.
SCHINDLER & J. TOMAN, LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICTS (1981); L. FRIEDMAN, THE LAW OF WAR: A
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY (1972); M. GREENSPAN, MODERN LAW OF LAND WARFARE (1959).
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It was not until the mid-eighteenth century that cultural property
was deemed exempt from those aspects of war which permit plunder
and destruction of enemy property .19 In 1758, Emheric de Vattel
stated the emerging rule concerning the conduct of belligerents
engaged in combat on foreign territory which prohibited wanton
destruction and pillage of cultural property. 20 De Vattel felt that
artistic treasures which "do honour to human society" should be
spared from the ravages of war, and temples, tombs, public
buildings, and "all works of a remarkable beauty" were to be
preserved as far as possible. 21
Such ideals, however, were lost on the rulers and military
leaders of Europe of that time. Napoleon systematically removed
art treasures from countries occupied by France during the
Napoleonic Wars. 22 After Waterloo, at the negotiations for the Convention of Paris in 1815, France attempted to include a clause allowing for retention of confiscated property in Paris. 23 Nevertheless,
the Duke of Wellington, speaking for the Allies, stated that
systematic looting of art by a conquering army was contrary to principles of justice and to the rules of modern warfare. 24 The Allies
ordered the return of both confiscated property, and property acquired by France through treaty, to their countries of origin. 25
While the treaties of peace subsequent to the Napoleonic Wars
did not expressly provide for the return of looted art, 26 the concept
of protecting cultural property had evolved from a theory developed
19. See .Case of the Vessel Marquis de Somereules, 1812 Stew. Adm. 482. During the
War of 1812, a ship carrying works of art belonging to the Philadelphia Museum of Art
was captured by the British Navy and the art objects aboard were held as prizes of war.
The Canadian court hearing the case held that objects of artistic value on the ship must
be returned to their owner. The court reasoned that art was a part of the common heritage
of mankind and, thus, protected from seizure during war.
20. E. DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS 364 (1829 ed.).
21. Id. at 433.
22. Napoleon reasoned that all Europeans shared a common heritage, but that France
was the most appropriate center for the great works of art. See Note, The Protection of
Art in Transnational Law, 7 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 689, 691-93 (1974) [hereinafter cited as
Art in Transnational Law]. In order to give his "acquisitions" legitimacy, Napoleon enacted
treaties containing art concession clauses. See Armistice Between France and the Pope, June
23, 1796, Martens, Recueil General des Traites de Paix 121 (1798), 53 Parry's T.S. 125; Treaty
Between France and the Pope, Feb. 19, 1791, 6 Martens Recueil Des Principaux Traites
(2d) 241.
23. Art in Transnational Law, supra note 22, at 693.
24. Id.
25. To have allowed a distinction between the two means by which Napoleon acquired
works of art would have made the practice of "looting by treaty" legitimate in future armed
conflicts. DESKBOOK, supra note 6, at 133; A rt in Transnational Law, supra note 22, at 693.
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by scholars to a practiced legal principle. A brief analysis of the
provisions contained in international agreements over the ensuing
150 years firmly established that the protection of cultural property is a basic and fundamental rule in the regulation of armed conflict. Its purpose is to preserve what can now be called the inalienable right of all peoples to their natural cultural heritage. 27
Certain international instruments concerning the regulation of
armed conflicts establish that certain violations of cultural property
rights explicitly or implicitly constitute an international crime,
under conventional or customary international law. As such, the
violators are subject to criminal prosecution and punishment under
the theories of universality and territoriality in accordance with
customary international law. Although the conventions referred to
below do not necessarily provide for a specific jurisdictional base,
subsequent interpretation and practice establish it. The following
is a brief discussion of some of the more relevant texts.
The Lieber Code, adopted in the United States in 1863,28 stated
that only public property was subject to confiscation and that
cultural property was not to be considered public property for purposes of confiscation or appropriation. 29 In no way could such property be seized, sold, given away, wantonly destroyed, damaged, or
privately appropriated until such time as a peace treaty determined
the ultimate ownership of the property. 30
26. The Allies considered it preferable to reach a private agreement with Louis XVIII
prior to the conclusion of the peace treaties, rather than to force a humiliating public acquiesence on him. Attempts to retrieve stolen art were, therefore, disjointed and sporadic.
Art in Transnational Law, supra note 22, at 693.
27. A number of human right documents reflect the principle that all people have
the right to participate in and enjoy their cultural heritage. See Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 A(III), U.N. Doc. A/71 at 70 (1948) (every person has a right
to own property and may not be arbitrarily deprived thereof; every person has a right to
freely participate in the cultural life of the community and to enjoy the arts); International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, G.A. Res. 2200 A(XXI), U.N. GAOR Supp.
16, at 49, U.N. Doc. A/62 (1966) (all people have a right to freely pursue their social and
cultural development; all persons have an equal right to enjoyment of social and cultural
rights, to participate in cultural life, and to benefit from the protection of moral and material
interests resulting from any literacy or artistic production of which that person is the author).
28. Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United States in the Field,
General Order No. 100, Adjutant General's Office, Department of the Army, Apr. 24, 1863
(Lieber Code), 2 F. Lieber, Contributions to Political Science, Including Lectures on the Constitution of the United States and Other Writings 245 (1881). The code contains regulations
for the proper conduct of United States troops during wartime.
29. Id. art. XXXI.
30. Id. art. XXXVI. See also art. XXXV (stating that classical works of art, libraries,
scientific collections or precious instruments must be secured against all avoidable harm).

https://surface.syr.edu/jilc/vol10/iss2/3

10

Bassiouni: Criminal Jurisdiction

290

Syr. J. Int'l L. & Com.

[Vol. 10:281

The 187 4 Conference of Brussels, 31 although never ratified,
declared that pillage was expressly prohibited and that enemy property could not be seized or destroyed unless militarily necessary. 32
Further, property belonging to institutions devoted to the arts,
whether privately or publicly-owned, or privately or publicly-funded,
was to be treated as private property and as such, seizure or
destruction thereof was prohibited and should be prosecuted. 33
The Hague Conventions of 189934 and 1907 35 on the Laws and
Customs of War on Land incorporated, in large part, the concepts
embodied in the Conference of Brussels. Both set out extensive provisions for the protection of cultural property in certain articles
discussed below. Pillage is formally prohibited by article XXIIl(g)
which prohibits destruction or seizure of enemy property unless
imperatively demanded by the necessity of war. 36 Private property
cannot be confiscated. 37 Attack or bombardment of undefended
towns, villages, or buildings, including cultural targets, is
prohibited. 38
Three provisions of the 1899 and 1907 Hague Conventions deal
specifically with protection of cultural property. Article XX VII imposes a duty on signatory states to take steps to spare buildings
dedicated to art, science, and religion and, further, imposes a duty
to give notice to the enemy by marking such buildings. An occupying power must administer all public institutions, including
museums, in such a manner as to preserve them. 39 In an even
broader provision, all seizure or destruction of, or intentional
31. Project of an International Declaration Concerning the Laws and Customs of War
(Declaration of Brussels), adopted by the Conference of Brussels, Aug. 27, 1874, 4 Martens
Nouveau Recueil (2d) 219.
32. Id. arts. XIII(g), XXXIX.
33. Id. art. VIII.
34. Convention (II) with Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land, July 29,
1899, 32 Stat. 1803 (1899), T.S. No. 403, 26 Martens Nouveau Recueil (2d) 949 [hereinafter
cited as 1899 Hague Convention (II)].
35. Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Oct. 18, 1907,
36 Stat. 2277 (1907), T.S. No. 539, 3 Martens Nouveau Recueil (3d) 461 [hereinafter cited
as 1907 Hague Convention (VI)].
36. 1899 Hague Convention (II), supra note 34, and 1907 Hague Convention (IV), supra
note 35, common art. 47. Every provision protecting cultural property in international
agreements is limited by the Rule of Necessity, which permits protection to the extent that
the subject of protection is not used for military purposes or situated so close to a military
objective as to render protection militarily impracticable.
37. Id. common art. 46.
38. Id. common art. 55.
39. Id. common art. 56.
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damage to institutions of arts and sciences, historic monuments,
or works of art or science is forbidden and should be subject to
legal proceedings. 40
Two other international instruments deal specifically with protection of cultural property from bombardment in time of war. The
Convention (IX) Concerning Bombardment by Naval Forces in Time
of War, 41 also enacted at The Hague in 1907, requires that all
necessary precautions be taken to spare historic monuments and
edifices devoted to worship, art, science, and charity. 42 Although
never formally ad9pted, the Hague Rules of Air Warfare reiterate
that historic monuments and other cultural institutions should be
spared from bombing during hostilities. 43
The Hague Conventions, however, failed to prevent widespread
damage and destruction to cultural property during World War I,
including the bombing of the Rheims Cathedral and the burning
of the library at Louvain. At the end of the war, a number of peace
treaties established reparations for confiscations of private property, including cultural property. Among them, the Treaty of
Versailles 44 mandated that art objects taken by Germany both in
the First World War and in the Franco-Prussian War be returned
to their country of origin. 45 Article 297(a) required Germany to cease
holding confiscated property and to restore it to its owners, if still
extant in specie, and to provide agreed-to compensation in lieu of
restitution. 46 A Mixed Arbitral Tribunal was established to adjudicate compensation to civilians for confiscated property. 47 Germany was also required to indemnify all bona fide third-party purchasers who might be injured by the restitution. 48 While not a party

40. Id.
41. Convention (IX) Concerning Bombardment by Naval Forces in Time of War, Oct.
18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2351 (1907), T.S. No. 542, 3 Martens Nouveau Recueil (3d) 604.
42. Id. art. V.
43. Hague Rules of Air Warfare, drafted by a Commission of Juries at The Hague,
Dec. 1922 - Feb. 1923, art. XXV, 17 AM. J. lNT'L L. SUPP. 245 (1923).
44. Treaty of Peace with Germany, June 28, 1919, 11 Martens Nouveau Recueil (3d)
323, 1919 For. Rel. (Paris Peace Conference XIII), 55, 740, 743, 2 Bevans 43 [hereinafter cited
as Treaty of Versailles].
45. Article 247 required Germany to replace the books, manuscripts, and incunabula
in corresponding number and value after the destruction of the Lou vain Library.
46. Id. art. 245; see also Art in Transnational Law, supra note 22, at 699.
47. Treaty of Versailles, supra note 44, art. 304.
48. Id. art. 297. Article 6 of the Annex to Section IV of the treaty, entitled Property,
Rights and Interests, makes Germany responsible for conservation of confiscated property
up to the time of restoration.
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to the Treaty of Versailles, the United States did sign the Treaty
of Berlin, 49 which contained similar provisions. A similar Mixed
Claims Commission was established in a subsequent treaty.so
The Treaty of Sevress1 between the Allies and Turkey ordered
Turkey to restore all seized trophies, archives, historical souvenirs
or works of art taken prior to October 1914.s2 Article 422 also required the return of all objects of religious, archaeological, historical
or artistic interest, taken prior to August 1914, to the government
of the territory from which they were taken within twelve months
after the enforcement date of the treaty.s3 This treaty, however,
never entered into effect.
In 1935, the United States initiated an inter-American treaty
called the Roerich Pact.s• The treaty declared that movable
monuments may not be treated as spoils of war.ss
Unfortunately, international agreement did little more to stop
damage to cultural property in World War II than it had in World
War I. The Third Reich systematically plundered the cultural property of Europe through the Einsatzstab der Dienststellen des
Reichleiters Rosenberg, a Reich department established to gather
objects d'art from all over Europe for "protection."s6
The prosecutions of the major Nazi war criminals firmly
established confiscation, destruction, and damage to cultural property as a war crime subject to prosecution and punishment,s7 and
49. Treaty of Berlin 1921, 42 Stat. 1939 (1921), T.S. No. 658, 12 U.N.T.S. 192.
50. Agreement for a Mixed Commission, done Aug. 10, 1922, T.S. No. 665, 26 L.N.T.S.
358.
51. Treaty of Sevres, Aug. 10, 1920, 15 AM. J. INT'L L. SUPP. 179-81 (1921) [hereinafter
cited as Treaty of Sevres].
52. Id. art. 420.
53. Id. Article 432 also provided for the preservation and return of the contents of
the Russian Archaeological Institute at Istanbul, initially to be surrendered to the Allies
in order to safeguard the rights of Russia.
54. Roerich Pact, supra note 2.
55. Id. art. 1.
56. Through a program of confiscation instituted in December 1941, 69,619 homes in
Western Europe were plundered (mostly Jewish), including 38,000 in Paris alone, and 26,
984 railroad cars were needed to transport the objects to Germany. A list of 21,902 confiscated pieces was compiled. U.S. v. Goering, 6 F.R.D. 69, 157 (1946) [hereinafter cited as
Nuremberg Judgment]. Four thousand "degenerate" post-impressionist works were destroyed
when the barn in which they were housed was needed to store grain. DESKBOOK, supra note
6, at 144. See also TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY
TRIBUNAL (U.S.G.P.O. 33 Vols.1948) (provides record of the trial proceedings, including official
documents, judgments and sentence of the defendants).
57. Nuremberg Judgment describes the acts of the Einsatztab Rosenberg as "Pillage
of Public and Private Property," and cites violations of articles 48, 49, 52, 53, 55, and 56
of the 1907 Hague Convention (IV), 6 F.R.D. 120, infra note 61.
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provided the first truly international enforcement of the international law protecting cultural property. The London Charter of
August 8, 1945,58 establishing the Nuremberg Tribunal, provided
that "plunder of public or private property, wanton destruction of
cities, towns or villages, or devastation not justified by military
necessity" was a crime punishable under the jurisdiction of the
Tribunal. 59 Pillage as extensive as that practiced by the Nazis was
held to violate article 56 of the 1907 Hague Convention (IV), and
the Nuremberg Judgment found the defendants guilty of violations
of international treaties, including the 1899 and 1907 Hague Conventions, and the Treaty of Versailles. 60 The Tribunal thus found
the crimes enumerated in the Charter to be war crimes recognized
under international law. Specifically, Alfred Rosenberg, director of
the Einstatzstab Rosenberg, was found guilty of war crimes based
on his responsibility for the plunder of Europe. 61
In an attempt to control looted articles after World War II,
the United States, Great Britain, and France signed a Statement
of Policy with Respect to the Control of Looted Articles. 62 The three
nations agreed to take measures to seek out looted articles and prevent their exportation, to encourage liberated countries to provide
lists of looted articles not yet recovered, to disseminate the lists
to art dealers and museums, and to alert the general public in order
to encourage the return of looted articles to their rightful owners.63
58. Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of
the European Axis, Aug. 18, 1945, 59 Stat. 1544 (1945), E.A.S. No. 472, 82 U.N.T.S. 279
[hereinafter cited as London Charter].
59. 59 Stat. at 1547. Other war crimes were prosecuted under Control Council Ordinance
No. 10, Punishment of Persons Guilty of War Crimes (Berlin, Dec. 20, 1945) Official Gazette
of the Control Council for Germany, No. 3, Jan. 31, 1946, which repeated, in article II(l)(b),
the definition of war crimes contained in the London Charter article 6(d). Article II(3) of
the ordinance provided for delivery of property forfeited or subject to restitution by the
Nuremberg Tribunal to the Control Council for disposition. T. TAYLOR, FINAL REPORT TO THE
SECRETARY OF THE ARMY ON THE NUREMBERG WAR CRIMES TRIAL UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW
No. 10 (U.S.G.P.O. 1949).
60. Nuremberg Judgment, supra notes 56, 57 and note 59. See also DESKBOOK, supra
note 6, at 144-64 (analysis of trials conducted during World War II).
61. See E. DAVIDSON, THE TRIAL OF THE GERMANS (1966), Trial of Alfred Rosenberg at
125; and R. CoNOT, JUSTICE AT NUREMBERG (1983), Trial of Alfred Rosenberg at 377.
62. Paris, July 8, 1946, reprinted in DESKBOOK, supra note 6, at 161-62. American public
policy requires the return of misappropriated property. On January 28, 1947, the State-War
Navy Coordinating Committee signed a manifesto entitled Return of Looted Object of Art
to Countries of Origin, which called for the return in reiteration of the Paris Statement of
Policy with Respect to Control of Looted Articles. DESKBOOK, supra note 6, at 160.
63. Germany was not the only country to confiscate works of art. The Third Army
of the United States under General George Patton removed a number _of masterpieces from
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After World War II, developments in the protection of cultural
property during times of armed conflict were reflected in the Fourth
Geneva Convention of August 12, 1949 Relative to the Protection
of Civilian Persons in Time of War. 64 Article 53, however, states
only that any destruction of real or personal property, whether
publicly or privately owned, is prohibited.65 Unfortunately, the
fourth 1949 Geneva Convention does not reiterate some of the more
detailed and explicit language of the Brussels Conference and the
1899 and 1907 Hague Conventions, though it makes certain violations a "grave breach" (i.e., a war crime).66
As a result, it became necessary to adopt a convention
specifically for the protection of cultural property during armed
conflict. This was accomplished in the 1954 Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict. 67 This
convention attempts to broaden the scope of the 1899 and 1907
Hague Conventions by taking into account the events of World Wars
I and II, and by incorporating certain provisions of the 1949 Geneva
Conventions to arrive at a truly effective and comprehensive agreement on the protection of cultural property during hostilities. 68 As
such, the 1954 convention applies to conflicts of an international
character, as well as to conflicts of a non-international character. 69
The convention also accounts for the possibility of damage to
cultural property prior to a declaration of war. 70 In addition, it provides for protective measures to commence during times of peace
in order that such protective mechanisms be in place at the outset
of hostilities. 71
Finally, the 1977 Protocols !72 and Il 73 Additional to the 1949
Geneva Conventions contain provisions for the protection of cultural
the Kaiser Friedrich Museum and the Nationalsgalerie in Berlin. The works were taken
on the grounds that the paintings needed protection from the Russians and were entrusted
to the National Gallery of Art in Washington, D.C. After the war, the works were returned
to Germany subsequent to being exhibited in the United States. DESKBOOK, supra note 6,
at 177-78.
64. 1949 Geneva Convention (IV), supra note 9.
65. Id.
66. Id. art. 147 (describing wanton and extensive destruction and appropriation of property to be a "grave breach" of the convention).
67. 1954 Hague Convention, supra note 2.
68. See supra note 2.
69. 1954 Hague Convention, supra note 2, art. 18(3).
70. Id. art. 18(1).
71. Id. art. 3.
72. Protocol I, supra note 9.
73. Protocol II, supra note 9.
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property. 74 A basic premise of the protocols is that parties shall
74. For a detailed description of the drafting of Protocol I, see H. LEVIE, PROTECTION
OF WAR VICTIMS: PROTOCOL I TO THE 1949 GENEVA CONVENTIONS (4 vols. 1979), and M. BOTHE,
K.J. PORTSCH & W.A. SOLF, NEW RULES FOR VICTIMS OF ARMED CONFLICTS 519-21 (1982), wherein
the authors state:
2.23. The nature of the offense is a direct attack upon certain civilian objects- the
highly privileged objects- with the result of their extensive destruction. As in para.
3 (b) and (c) a certain consequence of the act is required. It is, however, added that
the attack is justified if the objects have been apparently used in support of the
military effort (see reference to Art. 53, subpara. (b)), or when such objects are
located in the immediate proximity of military objectives. In this way the problem
of collateral damage is covered.
2.24. The subject of the offense does not appear in the provision. According to the
nature of the offence it may be committed by any military leader, even of a small
unit, who commands military personnel and has the yower to decide whether an
attack shall be made. It could also be the High Command of the armed forces of
a HCP.
2.26. The objects of the offence are "clearly recognized historic monuments, works
of art or places of worship" which fulfill certain requirements, i.e., (1) they "constitute the cultural or spiritual heritage of peoples"; and (2) "to which special protection has been given by special arrangement." As an example of such an arrangement reference is made to measures "within the framework of a competent international organization" without, however, mentioning this organization by name nor
the measures taken by it. Article 53 on the other hand openly refers to the Hague
Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict of 14 May 1954, and also to other instruments, in the process of providing
that its provisions are enacted "without prejudice" to this or other Conventions.
Even if it is admissible to regard the references to the unnamed international
organization and its measures as allusions to UNESCO and the Hague Convention
respectively, the legal significance of the reference remains doubtful. The definitions of the protected objects in subpara. (d) and in Art. 1 of the UNESCO Convention are not identical; and not all State Parties to the Conventions have also
ratified the UNESCO Convention .
. . . Under these circumstances it does not seem legitimate to use the UNESCO
Convention as a point of reference in the same way as "the relevant provisions
of this Protocol" -i.e. of Parts III and IV - have been used in other cases (e.g. para.
3, opening words) to explain the requirement that these acts had to be committed
"in violation of the Conventions and the Protocol."
2.26. Subparagraph (e) is based on a proposal by Switzerland which was accepted
without great difficulties. It repeats a provision of Arts. 50, 51, 130, 147 of the
Conventions without adding any new element. It is already covered by para. 1 and
is extended to new categories of. protected persons by para. 2.
2.27. Paragraph 5: From the beginning of the general debate on Art. 85 in the first
Committee there were suggestions that the principles applied by the war crimes
tribunals of the period after World War II should be incorporated into the Protocol. The practical consequences to be drawn from this incorporation were more
or less precisely explained .... The basis for the deliberations of the Subgroup
was a proposal limited to the statement that "grave breaches ... shall be regarded as war crimes," with a reference to Art. 6 of the Charter of the Nuremberg
International Military Tribunal added. This statement as worded, was certainly
not incorrect, if taken directly. Most of the examples of war crimes listed in Art.
6(2)(b) of the Charter are grave breaches under the Conventions (see 1.1). There
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at all times distinguish between civilian objects and military targets,
directing operations only against military objectives. 75 Without prejudice to the other relevant international instruments, article 53
of Protocol I prohibits acts of hostility against historic monuments,
works of art, or places of worship which constitute the cultural or
spiritual heritage of a people. The article further prohibits the use
of such property for the military effort and prohibits direct reprisals
against such property. 76 The Geneva Conventions and Additional
Protocols make it a "grave breach" to destroy clearly recognized
historic monuments, works of art, or places of worship. 77 As a "grave
breach," the offense constitutes a war crime, and thus an international crime. The offense, therefore, becomes subject to universal
as well as territorial jurisdiction, which in this case would be the
aggrieved state where the violative act was committed, or against
which it was committed.
Thus, under the regulation of armed conflicts, a violation of
internationally protected cultural property constitutes a war crime,
and is subject to prosecution and punishment as in the case of all
other international crimes. 78 In this respect, even though the relevant provisions of the applicable convention do not so state
specifically, the theory of universal jurisdiction is applicable to such
was, however, undeniably the danger that this formulation lent itself to the drawing of the opposite conclusion, viz. that all acts classified as war crimes, namely
all "violations of the laws and customs of war," would be regarded as grave breaches,
and that in this way the method of strict definition of certain acts as grave breaches,
adopted in the preceding paragraphs, would be nullified. This objection to a
reference to the Nuremberg Charter led to a proposal to delete it and to add the
introductory words: "Without prejudice to the application of the Conventions and
of the Protocol" in order to make it clear that the declaration that gave breaches
are war crimes has neither the consequence that all war crimes are grave breaches
nor the result that persons found guilty of having committed grave breaches lose
the protection of humanitarian law ....
2.28. The method employed in Art. 85 is selective. The only offences admitted are
those which are strictly defined and have a solid basis in the Protocol. ... There
are, however, no general rules which would generally prohibit reprisals in cases
where a prosecution of grave breaches is possible, nor any which provide that all
acts which are prohibited as reprisals are automatically also grave breaches. There
may be a presumption that an act which is prohibited as reprisal should also be
a grave breach (in view of its gravity), but it is not more than a presumption and
it is up to the legislator whether he is willing to follow it or not.
75. Protocol I, supra note 9, art. 48.
76. Id. See also Protocol II, supra note 9, art. 16.
77. Geneva Convention (IV), supra note 9, art. 47, and Protocol I, supra note 9, art.
85(4)(d).
78. See DRAFT INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL CODE, supra note 7.
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violations, in addition to the territorial theory, but not to the
exclusion of other theories that an aggrieved state may elect to
apply.
Since jurisdictional bases are not enunciated in the relevant
conventions, there are, of course, no provisions applicable to a ranking of jurisdictional theories nor are there any guidelines for the
resolution of conflicts of jurisdiction. Therefore, state-parties to
these conventions are left with whatever guidance customary international law and private international law may offer in that
respect. This leaves the potential for jurisdictional conflict without
effective sources of resolution in the relevant conventional international law. Thus, violations of these conventions are subject to
the judicial jurisdiction of a potential international criminal court,
should one be established, and to the jurisdiction of national military
tribunals, whether of a general, ordinary, or ad hoc nature.
These violations, as international crimes, will entail the duties
of states to prosecute or extradite and to provide judicial assistance
and cooperation. 79 These conventions, and the duties that they
create, and their consequences, will be contextually limited. They
will also be limited in their application to those persons who come
within the meaning of the relevant conventions and, eventually, to
national codes or laws of military justice. As a result, a convention
might exclude certain categories of offenses and certain categories
of persons from the judicial jurisdictional competence of the
tribunals, and all of the consequences attaching to the prosecution
and punishment of international crimes.
B. PROTECTION OF CULTURAL PROPERTY DURING TIMES OF PEACE

International agreements protecting cultural property during
times of peace are a product of this century. 80 The first international multilateral convention on this subject was concluded in 1954,
and is applicable essentially to armed conflicts, as discussed above,
although not exclusively limited to the context of war. 81 The 1954
Hague Convention applies to international traffic of unlawfully
seized cultural property during armed conflicts and after the termination of the conflict. Thus, by extension, the convention also applies to peacetime conduct which derives from conduct or events
whose origin was during wartime.
79. See supra note 15.
80. See supra note 2.
81. 1954 Hague Convention, supra note 2.
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The regional inter-American multilateral Roerich Pact, 82 signed
in 1935, was the earliest document to protect cultural property in
time of peace, although it also extends into periods of armed
conflict. 83 The important difference between these two instruments
and those applicable to other periods as discussed in this section
is the absence of contextual overlap and application. The wartime
related conventions apply to destruction, pillage and plunder by
armed forces, and policies and practices of occupying forces, w bile
the peacetime conventions apply to private conduct. Thus, the object of the protection is clearly distinguishable, as are the persons
intended to be deterred and eventually prosecuted and punished,
the practices sought to be prevented, controlled and suppressed,
the means to accomplish these objectives, and the remedies
available. Because of these distinctions, the enforcement scheme
reflected in the conventions analyzed below is also different. Occasionally, the contextual overlap in some conventions blurs the
distinctions as is discussed in the ensuing section.
The disproportionate number of international instruments protecting cultural property in time of war, in relation to the number
of conventions protecting cultural property in time of peace, is
perhaps due to the perception that the danger of destruction and
pillage that may befall cultural property is greater in wartime than
in peacetime. It should be noted that the need to protect cultural
property from theft and illicit transfer of ownership in peacetime
is just as potentially significant, both quantitatively and qualitatively. Further, conventions relating to a wartime context are
predicated on the unarticulated premise that the violative conduct
is state-sponsored, while those conventions relating to a peacetime
context are predicated on the premise that the violative conduct
is not state-sponsored, but rather is sponsored essentially by individuals for their personal or pecuniary interest. 84
82. Roerich Pact, supra note 2, art. 5.
83. It is interesting to note that, over the years, the conventions protecting cultural
property or treaties containing provisions protecting cultural property have progressively
expanded their applicability beyond situations of international armed conflict to periods of
civil conflict and belligerent occupation. In light of this progression perhaps the recent application of principles of international law to conduct occurring outside the context of
hostilities is a logical progression of the relevant international legislation making protection of cultural property during peacetime the final stage of this historicai development.
84. For the distinction between individual and state-sponsored activity within the meaning of international criminal law, see e.g., DRAFT INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL CODE, supra note
7, at 40-44.
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In the first instance, the consequence is that the conduct may
also inure to the benefit of the state who commits the violation
(even though committed by individuals). In the second instance, the
primary beneficiary of the violation is the private interest of those
who, in their private or personal capacity, commit such acts for their
pecuniary or personal interests. These presumed distinctions are
nowhere apparent in the relevant texts. Consequently, no jurisdictional distinctions are made in these texts as to the typology of violations, the applicable sanctions and, in general, their enforcement
aspects. Such enforcement should be tailored to the dual purpose
of protecting a defined interest from certain types of violative conduct and with due regard to the effectiveness of deterrence, prevention, control, and suppression.
The multilateral treaty of primary significance to the protection of cultural property in peacetime is the 1970 UNESCO Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit
Import, Export and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property. 85
The convention treats the term "cultural property" as inclusive of
a wide variety of property, and import, export, and transfer of
ownership of cultural property contrary to the provisions is deemed
illicit. 86 The parties undertake to prevent transfer of ownership and
illicit movement of such property, to ensure the earliest possible
restitution of property to the rightful owner, to admit actions for
recovery of cultural property brought by or on behalf of rightful
owners, and to recognize the indefeasible right of each state to
declare certain cultural property as inalienable and, therefore, ipso
facto, not to be privately exported. 87
The UNESCO Convention is supplemented by the 1972 Convention Concerning the Protection of World Cultural and Natural
Heritage. 88 International protection of the world cultural and natural
heritage requires the establishment of national protective means,
and a system of international cooperation and assistance designed
85. UNESCO Convention, supra note 1. The convention is the result of a 1962 UNESCO
Resolution (UNESCO Records of the General Conference, 12th Session, at 51-52 (1962)) on
the desirability of an international convention for the protection of cultural property. For
an ext ensive discussion of the convent ion, see Comment, The UNESCO Convention on the
Illicit Movement of Art Treasures, 12 HARV. INT'L L.J . 537 (1971).
86. UNESCO Convention, supra note l , art. 3. In add ition, t he ex port or transfe r of
ownership under direct compulsion from an occupied t ei-ritory by a foreign power is illicit.
I d. art. 11.
87. Id. art. 3.
88. World Heritage Convention, supra not e 2.
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to support the signatory parties in their efforts to, inter alia, identify and conserve that heritage. 89 States are to establish national
services to protect, conserve, and exhibit cultural property, 90 and
to take appropriate legal, scientific, technical, administrative, and
financial measures for the identification, protection, conservation,
and rehabilitation of the cultural heritage. 91 These means are the
essential basis for the effective control, prevention, and suppression of violative conduct.
Three regional agreements are also designed to accomplish
these purposes. Two are European and one is inter-American. The
European Cultural Convention of 195492 encourages a policy of common action among the signatory states to safeguard and encourage
the development of European culture. 93 The European Convention
on the Protection of the Archaeological Heritage of 1969,9' prohibits
illicit excavations 95 and promotes delimination and protection of
archaeological areas. 96
A third European Convention is in Draft, "European Convention
on Offences Relating to Cultural Property ," 96Awhich establishes in
Article 13 the following:
1.

Each Party shall take the necessary measures in order to
establish its competence to prosecute any offence relating to
cultural property:
a. committed on its territory, including its internal and territorial waters, or in its airspace;
b. committed on board a ship or an aircraft registered in it;
c. committed outside its territory by one of its nationals;
d. committed outside its territory by a person having
his/her habitual residence on its territory;
e. committed outside its territory when the cultural property against which that offence was directed belongs to
the said Party or one of its nationals;

89. Id. art. 7.
90. Id. art 5(b).
91. Id. art. 5(d).
92. European Cultural Convention, supra note 2.
93. Id. art. 2.
94. European Archaeological Convention, supra note 2.
95. Id. art. 7.
96. Id. art 2.
96A. See Council of Europe Doc. CDPC (84)8, Add. II, April 26, 1984, and the earlier
report of The Select Committee of Experts on International Co-operation in the Field of
Offences Relating to Works of Art D.oc. CDPC (84)3, January 30, 1984.
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f.

2.

committed outside its territory when it was directed
against cultural property originally found within its
territory.
In the cases referred to in paragraph l, sub-paragraphs (d) and
(f), a Party shall not be competent to institute proceedings in
respect of an offence relating to cultural property committed
outside its territory unless the suspected person is on its
territory.

It is clearly the most specific jurisdictional clause in any interna-

tional instrument.
The Organization of American States has adopted a Convention on the Protection of the Archaeological, Historical, and Artistic
Heritage of the American Nations. 97 The export of cultural property as defined by article 2 of the convention is considered unlawful,
except where authorized. 98 The convention discourages illegal export
or import of cultural property between the American states and
promotes cooperation and mutual appreciation with regard to
cultural property. 99
Two bilateral treaties are also relevant in this context. They
are between the United States and Mexico, and the United States
and Peru. In response to Mexican concern over the illegal export
of Mayan artifacts, the United States and Mexico entered into a
Treaty of Cooperation Providing for the Recovery and Return of
Stolen Archaeological, Historical and Cultural Properties. 100 It was
agreed that the states would deter illicit excavation and theft
of cultural property, 101 and employ the legal means at their disposal
to recover and return objects stolen following the effective date
of the treaty. 102 The combination of the United States National
Stolen Property Act 103 and a 1972 Mexican law giving title to all
pre-Hispanic artifacts to the Mexican state, subject to rights acquired before enactment of the law, 104 has resulted in two landmark
97. OAS Convention, supra note 2.
98. Id. art. 3.
99. Id. art 1.
100. Treaty of Cooperation Providing for the Recovery and Return of Stolen Proper·
ties, July 12, 1970, 22 U.S.T. 494, T.I.A.S. No. 7088 (effective Mar. 24, 1973) [hereinafter cited
as United States·Mexico Treaty].
101. Id. art Il(l)(b).
102. Id. art. 111(1). The Attorney General of the United States is, therefore, authorized
to institute civil actions in appropriate district courts to recover property illegally exported
from Mexico. Id. at 111(3).
103. 18 u.s.c. § 2315 (1976).
104. Ley Federal Sohre Monumentos y Zontas Arqueologicos, Artisticos y Historicos,
312 D.O. 16, 16 May 1972.
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court decisions. These decisions held that an object may be considered as stolen under the National Stolen Property Act subsequent to a declaration of ownership by a foreign country. 105
In 1981, the United States and Peru signed an Agreement for
Recovery and Return of Stolen Archaeological, Historic, and
Cultural Property, 106 similar to the 1970 Mexican-American treaty.
The Peruvian agreement, however, focuses on communication concerning stolen property likely to be introduced into international
trade. 107 The parties agree to detect and locate such objects entering their territory and to employ all legal means to recover and
return stolen cultural property to the requesting party .108
Lastly, a number of international conventions, not on the protection of cultural property but on the law of the sea, contain provisions which affect marine archaeology. 109 In fact, due to the essentially jurisdictional nature of the conventions on the law of the sea,
these documents are the only international agreements to provide
explicit statements of jurisdiction which can be applied to cultural
property, albeit within a narrow context. The Convention on the
Law of the Sea, opened for signature in 1982, 110 contains two ar105. United States v. Hollinshead, 495 F.2d 1154 (9th Cir. 1974); United States v. McClain,
545 F.2d 988 (5th Cir. 1977) [hereinafter cited as McClain I]; United States v. McClain, 593
F.2d 658 (5th Cir. 1979) [hereinafter cited as McClain II]. For a further discussion of McClain
I, see Note, Criminal Law: Theft of Artifacts-Once a National Declares Ownership of an Artifact, an IUegally Ex-port;ed Artifact Can Be Considered Stolen Under the National Stolen Property Act, 17 VA. J. INT'L L. 793 (1977).
In order to give Mexico's law international effect, the United States has adopted an Act
to Prevent Importation of Pre-Columbian Sculpture and Murals, 19 U.S.C. §§ 2091-2095 (1976),
which prohibits the import into the United States from anywhere in the world of preColumbian monumental architecture, sculpture or murals, without a certificate stating that
the export was not in violation of the laws of the country of origin of the property.
106. Agreement for Recovery and Return of Stolen Property, September 15, 1981, 80
Stat. 271; T.l.A.S. No. 10136 (effective Sept. 15, 1981) [hereinafter cited as United StatesPeru Treaty].
107. Id. at 11(1).
108. Id. art.11(2). For further discussion of the treaty, see Note, Emerging U.S. Policy
with Regard to the International Movement of National Cultural Property, 7 INT'L L.J. 166
(1982).
109. While the conventions do not specifically deal with marine archaeology, they
establish a division of maritime jurisdiction. Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone, done Apr. 29, 1958, 15 U.S.T. 1606, T.l.A.S. No. 5639, 516 U.N.T.S. 205 (effective Sept. 10, 1964); Convention on the Continental Shelf, done Apr. 29, 1958, 15 U.S.T. 471,
T.l.A.S. No. 5578, 499 U.N.T.S. 311 (effective June 10, 1964); Convention on the High Seas,
done Apr. 29, 1958, 13 U.S.T. 2313, T.l.A.S. No. 5200, 450 U.N.T.S. 82 (effective Sept. 30,
1962); Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources of the High Seas,
done Apr. 29, 1958, 17 U.S.T. 138, T.I.A.S. No. 5969, 559 U.N.T.S. 285 (effective Mar. 20, 1966).
110. Convention on the Law of the Sea, supra note 3.
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ticles dealing with cultural property found beyond a nation's shores.
Article 149 states that all archaeological or historic objects found
beyond the limits of national jurisdiction should be preserved or
disposed of for the benefit of mankind, with particular regard being
paid to the preferential rights of the state of origin, state of cultural
origin, or state of historical and archaeological origin of the property. Cultural property found in the contiguous zone is provided
limited protection under article 303 of the convention. 111
The various conventions discussed hereinabove establish explicitly or implicitly two theories of jurisdiction: the territoriality
theory, which is common to all the conventions, and what, for lack
of a specific theory, could fall under an extension of the passive
personality theory whereby the county of origin maintains a continuous right over the property irrespective of its subsequent illicit
transfer or change of actual possessory control (much as the theory
proper extends to the protection of the nationals of a given state). 112
All of these conventions, though recognizing the right of state
ownership and state regulation of various aspects of excavation,
and the import, export and trade of cultural property as defined in
each relevant instrument, apply essentially a territorial jurisdictional theory with respect to law making and law enforcement. But,
they do extend certainly and explicitly to an in rem or quasi in rem
right of the state of origin as pertains to the objects in question
beyond territorial confines. In that respect, however, it is a form
of the dual extension of the territorial theory through the subjective and objective territorial application which effectively extends
it extra-territorially. 113 The conventions can also be said to embody
the theory of the protected interest, 114 which in this context overlaps
with the extensions of the territoriality theory. These theories will
be briefly discusse.d below.
111. Id.
112. For an excellent overview of the views of jurisdiction, see Blakesley, United States
Jurisdiction over Extraterritorial Crime, 73 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1109 (1982) [hereinafter
referred to as Blakesley]. For the application of the passive personality doctrine, see Attorney Gen. of Israel v. Eichmann, 36 1.L.R. 5 (Israel Dist. Ct. Jerus. 1961). See also P.
PAPADATOS, THE EICHMANN TRIAL (1964); for the only decision by the International Court of
Justice on that subject, see The S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk), 1927 P.C.l.J., ser. A., No. 10, at
74 (Moore, J., dissenting); II M. Hudson, World Court Reports 71 (1935).
113. See Blakesley, supra note 112, 1114-32. See also George, Jurisdictional Basis for
Criminal Legislation and Its Enforcement, 1983 MICH. Y.B. INT'L. LEGAL STUD. 3-42.
114. See Blakesley, supra note 112, at 1132-39. See also Marcuss & Richard, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction in U.S. Trade Law: The Need for a Consistent Theory, 20 COL UM. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 439 (1981) [hereinafter referred to as Marcuss & Richard].
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The above-mentioned instruments presuppose that all states
share the same values and interests in protecting cultural property
from the cupidity of individuals acting in their private or personal
capacity to the detriment of the concerned states and other protected parties. That premise leads to another assumption, namely
that states will cooperate in the prevention and suppression of such
violations. Because states under these conventions are presumed
not to sponsor such practices (which are also presumed to be contrary to their national laws) the legal nature of the violation is that
of a common crime with transnational effect. However, a different
characterization can also be made. Because such conduct potentially
affects all states, is mostly committed transnationally, and violates
existing international prescriptions, it should be deemed an international crime irrespective of whether committed in time of peace
or war .115 Furthermore, since it is also an international crime when
committed in time of war, the violation should not be considered
any differently in time of peace when states are even more desirous
and capable of international cooperation in preventing and suppressing such violative conduct.
In the Draft International Criminal Code prepared by this
writer, theft of national and archaeological treasures is deemed an
international crime because of the reasons stated above. 116 The draft
code's section dealing with enforcement, article IV, sets out theories
of jurisdiction applicable to all crimes contained in the code and
establishes a ranking of these theories as a rule for resolution of
jurisdictional conflicts. 117
The conventions discussed above, which apply to the context
of peace, cover categories of offenses and offenders which differ
from those covered by conventions on the regulation of armed conflicts discussed in the earlier section. They differ not only as to contextual application, but also as to typology of violations, their
characterization (as an international crime, a transnational crime,
or a national common crime), the category of offenders to which
a violation applies, and the competent jurisdictional forum (i.e., national tribunals of ordinary criminal or civil jurisdiction, as opposed
to an international criminal court or national military tribunals).
As yet no convention exists which bridges the different contexts,
applies comprehensively to all types of offenses and offenders, and
115. See, e.g., DRAFT INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL CODE, supra note 7.
116. DRAFT INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL CODE, supra note 7, at 98. See also Appendix infra.
117. Id. §§ 1, 2, at 145.
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establishes measures common, or distinct, for these offenses and
offenders. The lack of a comprehensive scheme of enforcement is
thus reflected in the absence of effective jurisdictional bases that
may extend beyond the territoriality theory common to all relevant international instruments.

III. THEORIES OF JURISDICTION RECOGNIZED
AND APPLIED IN CONVENTIONAL AND CUSTOMARY
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW
Five theories of jurisdiction are recognized under international
law as giving rise to the power to legislate and the power to enforce. They are, in order of their general international recognition: 118
(1) the territorial theory, based on the notion of sovereignty that
a state may assert jurisdiction over any conduct committed within
its territory, extended by the subjective and objective· theories of
territoriality, and the law of the flag, or floating territoriality; (2)
the protective or protected interest theory, based on the concept
that a state should be allowed to assert jurisdiction over conduct
occurring outside the state's territory which threatens the significant interests of the state; (3) the active personality theory, based
on the notion that concomitant to a citizen's right to be protected
by the state, the citizen has certain duties to his country even extraterritorially; (4) the passive personality theory, based on the
theory that a st.ate has a legitimate interest in the protection of
its nationals abroad; and (5) the universality theory, based on the
theory that crimes delicti }us gentium should be subject to the
jurisdiction of all states, irrespective of where the acts have been
committed, to allow for the protection of the universal values and
interests of humankind.
A. TERRITORIAL THEORY AND ITS EXTENSIONS

The territorial theory is the basis upon which all states
prescribe and enforce rules of conduct within their territory. As
indicated previously, the term "jurisdiction" refers to the rulemaking and rule-enforcing powers of a state. Moreover, as stated
earlier, the operative question is whether these two aspects of
jurisdiction must co-exist within the territorial boundaries of the
state asserting jurisdiction. Under general principles of international
law and private international law, there is no such requirement.
Indeed, a state may exercise its jurisdiction in one of its many forms
118. See supra notes 4, 112, 113.
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(in personam, in rem, quasi in rem) without necessarily applying
its own laws, either because its laws will require or permit the application of another state's law, or because it is the only judicially
competent forum which will apply another state's law. 119 Thus, a
state having jurisdiction over the alleged offender or the property
in question (the rule-enforcing state) may apply the law of a foreign
state which has been violated by the conduct of the offender (rulemaking state). A number of cases involving protection of cultural
property have made use of foreign law as a basis for judicial action. 120
Considering the diverse national legislation concerning protection
of cultural property, application of the law of the aggrieved state,
through the conflict of laws rules of the adjudicating state, may
resolve the conflicts of law problem. 121
Under existing international instruments and the laws of most
states, the courts of the state where the property is located at the
time of the claim will have the first opportunity to exercise civil
and criminal jurisdiction. This is true irrespective of whether the
civil basis of jurisdiction is in personam, in rem, or quasi in rem,
and whether the criminal prosecution is in personam or in absentia. Among the many jurisdictional problems is one related to the
concomitance of civil and criminal jurisdiction, and the concurrent
presence within the jurisdiction of both the defendant and the property. Thus, if the property is stolen from State A, stored in State
B, the violator is a citizen of State C, and is found in State D, there
are multiple competent jurisdictions. There is no basis for determining which has priority, or which jurisdiction is entitled to judicial
assistance prior to or during the trial, or which one is entitled to
the enforcement of its judgment.
None of the existing conventions deal with these questions, nor
do they provide a sufficient basis from which to extrapolate some
guidance for the resolution of such conflict of laws problems. Thus,
the national law of each affected state will control. The result is
diversity, inconsistency and unpredictability of outcome as to such
conflicts of judicial jurisdiction and conflicts of applicable substantive laws. These problems cannot begin to find a modicum of harmonization under the present state of the applicable substantive
law of international protection of cultural property. Consequently,
the need for further international legislation is required.
119. See supra note 5.
120. See supra note 105.
121. See, e.g., supra notes 5, 119.
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B. PROTECTIVE OR PROTECTED INTEREST THEORY

Although the protective or protected interest theory implies
conduct committed abroad which when causing an internal impact
affects intangible rights specifically located within the territory,
it is a particularly appropriate theory to apply to the protection
of cultural property .122 In accordance with the theory, the state from
which the cultural property has been illegally removed would have
jurisdiction over other interested states or would be able to exercise jurisdiction over an offender. But, the priority of such a theory
over another is not established, save for the general proposition
that the territoriality theory is deemed in general to have the higher
priority. Perhaps this is because of the simple practical logic that
the state where the offender, the offense, or the object of the offense is found cannot be effectively stripped of its right of legal
action. It must also be stated that an extension of the territoriality
theory under the subjective-objective theory will usually encompass the protected interest theory. This extension of the protected
interest theory is akin to a long-arm extension of jurisdiction by
the state claiming a right or interest in the property in question
to protect such rights or interests in the property in question. The
above result provides a valid and effective basis for assertion of
jurisdiction. Therefore, the theory should be embodied in the various
international conventions protecting cultural property.
C. ACTIVE PERSONALITY THEORY

Jurisdiction over violations of international agreements protecting cultural property may be asserted through the active personality theory, thereby allowing a state to assert jurisdiction over
crimes committed by nationals outside the state's territory. In order
to determine whether this theory is available to a state, two approaches may be taken. The first is to review the general laws of
the state and ascertain whether they incorporate the active personality theory. The second is to review any specific laws dealing
with protection of cultural property with the same view.
In terms of general laws, a number of countries provide for
the doctrine of active personality .123 In such case, a citizen of a coun-

122. RESTATEMENT, supa note 4, § 33; Harvard Draft Code, supra note 4, arts. 7, 8.
123. See Matter of Assarsson, 635 F.2d 1237 (7th Cir. 1980) and Matter of Assarsson,
687 F.2d 1157 (8th Cir. 1982) where Sweden requested the extradition of the relator from
the United States for a crime committed in Denmark on the basis of its criminal law provisions that make a Swedish citizen subject to prosecution in Sweden for a crime committed
in another state. See also EXTRADITION, supra note 4.
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try who commits a crime anywhere in the world, irrespective of
whether the conduct constitutes a crime in the legal system of the
country of origin, is subject to the penal jurisdiction of his country
of citizenship. Consequently, where conduct constitutes a crime in
the territory in which it occurred, any violation would subject an
actor to the jurisdiction of his national state, in addition to the
jurisdiction of the state in which the conduct took place. 124
D. PASSIVE PERSONALITY THEORY

The passive personality theory is not per se applicable to the
protection of cultural property. However, if the notion of protection can extend from persons to property and if an intangible right
in that cultural property is a national right (as well as a private
proprietary interest), then it could be said to apply .125

E. UNIVERSALITY THEORY
The historical development of the law of armed conflict makes
it clear that damage and confiscation of cultural property is a war
crime. Such conduct was prosecuted under the universality theory
at the Nuremberg trials. 126 However, there is some difficulty, under
certain international instruments, in applying the universality
theory beyond situations of armed conflict to encompass conduct
outside the context of an international crime. If one regards pillage
in any form, conducted at any time, to be an international crime,
then the principle of universality would apply. 127 Although a number
of countries have been reluctant to assert jurisdiction on this basis
for whatever crime, it may be contended that as soon as an international crime is established, universality of jurisdiction obtains as
a rule of customary international law. 128 Recognition for this propItaly has a similar theory of jurisdiction, in particular where an Italian national is accused of a crime in another state. Where extradition is requested but denied, atr Italy does
not allow extradition of its nationals, the Italian judicial authorities, at the request of the
Procuratore Generale and with the concurrence of the Minister of Justice, will approve prosecution of the offender in the Italian criminal courts, thus applying the active personality
theory. ITALIAN PENAL CODE (CODICE PENALE), art. 9 (E.H. Wise trans.1978). This question was
dealt with in part at the Xlth International Congress of Comparative Law, Caracas,
Venezuela, 1982, and covered by this writer as a reporter on question V, see Bassiouni,
GENERAL REPORT ON THE JUDICIAL STATUS OF THE REQUESTED STATE DENYING EXTRADITION,
PROCEEDINGS OF XITH INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS OF COMPARATIVE LAW (in print).
124. See id.
125. See supra note 112.
126. Nuremberg Judgment, supra note 56, at 107-11; Charter of the International Military
Tribunal: Far East, January 19 and amended Apr. 26, 1946, T.I.A.S . No. 1589, and note 57.
127. See generally DRAFT INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL CODE, supra note 7, and Appendix

infra.
128. Id.
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osition can be found in both the Nuremberg and Tokyo war crimes
trials. 129 In addition, the universality theory has been deemed to
be an appropriate jurisdictional theory with respect to the Genocide
Convention, 130 to piracy,1 31 and to hijacking under the 1970 Hague
Convention 132 and the 1971 Montreal Convention. 133
An examination of these and other international criminal law
conventions leads to the conclusion that a doctrine of universality
of jurisdiction over international crimes exists under conventional
and customary international law. 134 Thus, if violations of conventions protecting cultural property can be considered to be international crimes, universality would apply. 135

IV.

UNITED STATES' APPROACHES

The United States has boldly extended extraterritorial application of criminal jurisdiction in recent years, 136 though in terms of
potential conflicts of laws, this may not be a positive development.
The trend toward extraterritoriality in the United States began
with the American Banana 137 and Alcoa138 cases, and other cases in
the antitrust area. The jurisdictional theories applied in these cases
were reflected and expanded in subsequent legislation, including

129. See infra note 134.
130. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, done Dec.
9, 1948, 73 U.N.T.S. 277. For a discussion of the crime of genocide, see Bassiouni, Genocide
and Racial Discrimination, in I M.C. BASSIOUNI & V.P. NANDA, A TREATISE ON INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL LAW 523 (1973); Lemkin, Genocide as a Crime Under International Law, 41 AM. J.
INT'L L. 145 (1947).
131. G.O.W. MUELLER & E.M. WISE, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 23 (1965). See also
Sundberg, Piracy: Air and Sea, in I M.C. BASSIOUNI & V.P. NANDA, A TREATISE ON INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 455 (1973).
132. Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, done Dec. 16, 1970,
22 U.S.T. 1641, T.l.A.S. No. 7192, 860 U.N.T.S. 105 (effective Oct. 14, 1971).
133. Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation, done Sept. 3, 1971, 24 U.S.T. 564, T.I.A.S. No. 7570 (effective Jan. 26, 1973).
134. Harvard Draft Code, supra note 4, art. 97. The Harvard convention suggests that
universality would be applicable to such international crimes as slavery, traffic in persons
and drugs, and war crimes. See also Feller, Jurisdiction over Offenses with a Foreign Element, in II M.C. BASSIOUNI & V.P. NANDA, A TREATISE ON INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 5
(1973). See DRAFT INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL CODE, supra note 7, for the 20 other international
crimes.
135. The conventions in question, of course, skirt this issue altogether, and no case has
taken this particular position.
136. EXTRADITION, supra note 4, ch. VI,§ 7, p. 1, and supra note 111and112.
137. American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347 (1909). See also Foreign
Trade Antitrust Improvements Act of 1982, Pub. L. 97-290, title IV, § 401, 96 Stat. 1246
(codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1 note, 6a) and amended 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1982).
138. United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
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the Trading with the Enemy Act, 139 the Export Administration
Act,1 40 the anti-boycott legislation, 141 the Foreign Corrupt Practices
Act, 142 the Securities and Exchange Act, 143 and the Internal Revenue
Code. 144 There are presently eighteen different criminal provisions
of the United States Code that apply extraterritorially. 145 These and
other special legislative enactments broaden the scope of United
States' extraterritorial jurisdiction without asserting any specific
theory therefor.
Although the Federal Criminal Code currently does not contain an expanded extraterritorial jurisdiction provision, extensions
of criminal jurisdiction, as reflected in the proposed revisions to
the Code contain the broadest possible bases ever considered or
applied (but follow prior extensions of specific legislation). 146 No
139. Trading with the Enemy Act, 50 App. U.S.C. §§ 1-44 (1976 & Supp. V 1981) amended
by Pub. L. No. 97-164, Title I,§§ 160(a)(17), 161(9), 96 Stat. 48, 49 (codified at 50 App. U.S.C.A.
§§ 10, 42 (1982)).
140. Export Administration Act of 1979, 50 App. U.S.C. §§ 2401-2420 (1976 & Supp.
V 1981) amended by Export Administration Act of 1981, Pub. L . 97-145, 95 Stat. 1727 (codified
at 50 App. U.S.C. §§ 2401note,2405, 2410, 2411, 2417 (Supp. V. 1981)). See Note, Trade-The
Export Administration Act of 1979, 4 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L.J. 361 (1980). See also Marcuss
& Richard, supra note 114.
141. 50 App. U.S.C. § 2407 (Supp. II 1979). See also Marcus & Richard, supra note 114.
142. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, Pub. L. 95-213, Title I, § 101, 91 Stat. 1494
(codified at 15 U.S.C §§ 78a note, 78dd-l, 78dd-2 and amending §§ 78m and 78ff (1982)). See
Note, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: Problems of Extraterritorial Application, 12 VAND.
J. TRANSNAT'L L. 689 (1979).
143. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404 Title I, Pub. L. 48 Stat. 881 (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C §§ 78a-78hh (1982)). See Note, Extraterritorial Application of the Federal
Securities Code: An Examination of the Role of International Law in American Courts, 11
VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 711 (1978); Note, Securities-Transnational Application ofAnti-Fraud
Provisions of the Federal Securities Laws Expanded-SEC v. Kasser, 8 SETON HALL L. REV.
795 (1977).
144. 26 l.R.C. §§ 1-9041 (1976 & Supp. V. 1981).
145. See Blakesley, supra note 112.
146. The Criminal Code Reform Acts of 1977 amending 18 U.S.C., 95th Cong., 1st Sess.
(May 1977). See also the second version of the proposed Federal Criminal Code presented
in S.B. 1437, §§ 202, 1734, 1751. See Note, E xtraterritorial Jurisdiction Under the Proposed
Federal Criminal Codes: Senate Bill 1630 and House Bill 1647, 12 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 305
(1982).
These extensions have been proposed without any regard whatsoever to the conflict
of laws questions that may be created, and certainly without due regard for the foreign policy
and diplomatic consequen~es of creating such a maze of regulations. Recall that the result
of President Reagan's embargo of December 1981 on trading with the U.S.S.R. It involved
the attempted extraterritorial application of U.S. law to prevent export to the U.S.S.R. of
products manufactured in Great Britain and France predicated on licenses of technology
originally developed in the United States. The decision created a serious conflict between
the United States and those two countries.
The proposed changes to the Federal Criminal Code go far beyond the provisions of

Published by SURFACE, 1983

31

Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce, Vol. 10, No. 2 [1983], Art. 3

1983]

Criminal Jurisdiction

311

extraterritorial provisions exist, however, with respect to enforcement of provisions protecting cultural property, but nothing would
prevent the adoption of such legislation which could be predicated
on the active personality theory. The United States would,
therefore, be able to prosecute an American citizen who has committed a violation of a convention to which the United States is
a party, even if that violation occurred outside United States
territory .147

V. APPRAISAL OF CONVENTIONAL
ENFORCEMENT SCHEMES IN THE PROTECTION OF
CULTURAL PROPERTY
Jurisdiction is the cornerstone of enforcement, therefore
jurisdiction and enforcement are interlocked. The choice of a
jurisdictional theory is a reflection of the intended enforcement
scheme, and, mutatis mutandi, the determination of the scope of
enforcement will entail the choice of a given jurisdictional theory.
The wider the jurisdictional scope, the broader and, presumably,
the more effective is enforcement. This is why the scope of the enforcement scheme of a relevant convention is an intricate part of
its jurisdictional basis.
The relevant group of conventions analyzed herein is comprised
of the 1954 Hague Convention protecting cultural property during
armed conflict,1 48 the 1970 UNESCO Convention, 149 the World
Heritage Convention,1 50 the Convention on the Law of the Sea,1 51
the regional European conventions, 152 the OAS Convention, 153 and

the RESTATEMENT, supra note 4. See also Hacking, The Increasing Extraterritorial Impact of
U.S. Laws: A Cause for Concern Amongst Friends of America, 1 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus.1 (1979);
Feinberg, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction and the Proposed Federal Criminal Code, 72 J. CRIM.
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 385 (1981).
147. With respect to internationally protected persons such as diplomats, foreign government officials, heads of state, etc., see 18 U.S.C. § 1116(bX6) (1976) which provides for U.S.
jurisdiction irrespective of where the crime was committed; Congress has extended federal
jurisdiction for crimes against certain high-ranking officials beyond United States jurisdiction. 95 Stat. 1219, Pub. L. 97-285 (S.907), 18 U.S.C. § 351 and § 1751(g) (1976).
148. 1954 Hague Convention, supra note 2.
149. UNESCO Convention, supra note 1.
150. See supra note 2.
151. Convention on the Law of the Sea, supra note 3.
152. European Cultural Convention, supra note 2; European Archaeological Convention, supra note 2.
153. OAS Convention, supra note 2.
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the United States-Mexico 154 and United States-Peru treaties. 155 The
common purpose of these instruments is to protect a specifically
identifiable kind of property right. However, the conventions have
not been drafted to provide protection irrespective of any and all
particular circumstances. Why, it may be asked, has no single convention dealing with all aspects of the protection of cultural property been drafted? The answer is simply a lack of political will on
the part of the world community to do so, especially in light of conflicting values, interests, and strategies of the diverse participants
in the world community.
The instruments, however, appear to share the same basic
values expressed in the general goals of protecting national cultural
property and national heritage as a basic cultural human right. 156
But, a divergence appears in the definition of what constitutes
cultural property,1 57 and that divergence has an impact on the
strategies of protective schemes contemplated by the international
instruments protecting cultural property. Thus, enforcement models
differ and jurisdictional approaches are not clearly established
beyond the most obvious, which in this instance is the territoriality principle.
One has to ask why the universality principle has not been
recognized as applicable to these violations as when they occur in
time of war and are considered war crimes, and for that matter
to other international crimes as discussed above. The answer is
simply that the international legislator has not yet unequivocally
recognized violations of those international agreements protecting
cultural property to be international crimes beyond the context of
war crimes. One of the problems is the unfortunate distinction still
preserved in international law between the law of war and the law
of peace. Such a distinction should clearly be discarded in the area
of international protection of cultural property, as it has largely
disappeared in the area of international protection of human
rights. 158 Another reason is that government officials who negotiate
154. United States-Mexico Treaty, supra note 100.
155. United States-Peru Treaty, supra note 106.
156. See 1954 Hague Convention, supra note 2, preamble; UNESCO Convention, supra
note l, preamble; World Heritage Convention, supra note 2, preamble; European Cultural
Convention, supra note 2, art. 5; and e.g., supra note 28.
157. See 1954 Hague Convention, supra note 2, art. 1; UNESCO Convention, supra note
1, art. 1; World Heritage Convention, supra note 2, arts. l, 2; European Archaeological Convention, supra note 2, art. 1; OAS Convention, supra note 2, art. 2.
158. See supra note 17.
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international agreements are traditionally cautious and conservative, expecting to do only what is most widely and generally
accepted, seldom treading new ground. As a result, they leave to
other sources of international law what is really the more appropriate task of conventional international law. Thus, the task frequently befalls the "publicist" to advance the frontiers of international law .159
The conventions are generally consistent in their limited and
narrow approach to the question of jurisdiction. 160 Although they
may implicitly establish a duty to punish or criminalize 161 and, at
times, a duty to cooperate in investigating, prosecuting, and
punishing those who commit offenses against cultural property, 162
the conventions fail to explicitly make such statements. In comparing the agreements dealing with the protection of cultural property with other international criminal law conventions, one notes
the absence of specific and broader provisions on jurisdiction,
extradition, 163 and judicial assistance and cooperation in penal
matters. 164
As stated above, the jurisdictional basis in all of the conventions is the more limited territorial basis, and that theory is only
implicitly established. 165 The conventions contain such indirect

159. See Statute of the ICJ, art. 38, 59 Stat. 1031, T.S. No. 993, 3 Bevans 1153.
160. See 1954 Hague Convention, supra note 2, arts. 3, 28; UNESCO Convention, supra
note 1, arts. 2, 5, 6, 7, 8, 13; World Heritage Convention, supra note 2, arts. 4, 5, 6, 7; European Cultural Convention, supra note 2, art. 5; European Archaeological Convention, supra
note 2, art. 7.
161. See 1954 Hague Convention, supra note 2, art. 28; UNESCO Convention, supra note
l, art. 8.
162. UNESCO Convention, supra note l, art. 13(c); OAS Convention, supra note 2, arts.
22, 14; United States Mexico Treaty, supra note 100, art. III.
163. The one exception is the OAS Convention, supra note 2, which in article 14 subjects those responsible for crimes against cultural property to appropriate extradition
treaties. Article 11 imposes a duty to institute judicial action where required by the laws
of a state petitioned for recovery of illegally acquired cultural property. See also DRAFT INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL CODE, supra note 7.
164. For judicial assistance and cooperation, see Gutzner, International Judicial
Assistance and Cooperation in Criminal Matters, in II M.C. BASSIOUNI & V.P. NANDA, A
TREATISE ON INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 189 (1973); Markees, TheDifferenceinConceptBe-

tween Civil and Comrrwn Law Countries as to Judicial Assistance and Cooperation in Criminal
Matters, in II. M.C. BASSIOUNI & V.P . NANDA, supra, at 171; 45 REVUE INTERNATIONAL DE DROIT
PENAL (1975). See also European Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, done
Apr. 20, 1952, 472 U.N.T.S. 185, Europ.T.S. 30, and European Convention on Transfer of
Proceedings in Criminal Matters, done May 15, 1972, Europ.T.S. 73.
165. Kegel & Seidel-Hohenveldern (trans. by Darby), On the Territoriality Principle in
Public International Law, 5 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 249 (1982).
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statements as "in the most appropriate manner [for each state]," 166
"as appropriate for each country ," 167 "shall be governed by domestic
legislation," 168 or "situated within their own territory." 169 Perhaps
because the territoriality theory is so accepted, the drafters felt
that there was no need to specifically state it. The Convention on
the Law of the Sea, also based on the territorial principle, remains
the only one to provide explicit jurisdictional provisions, while also
giving recognition to the jurisdictional claims of the country of
origin, cultural origin, or historical and archaeological origin of the
property .170
The 1954 Hague Convention states merely that parties will
prepare in time of peace, to safeguard cultural property situated
within their own territory by taking such measures as they consider appropriate. 171 Further, the parties will take necessary steps,
within the framework of their ordinary criminal jurisdiction, to prosecute and impose penal or disciplinary sanctions upon persons,
regardless of nationality. 112 The former provision asserts the application of national law as the means through which cultural property
is to be protected. The latter provision would appear to allow assertion of jurisdiction on the basis of the subjective-objective territorial
theory of jurisdiction, in that it does not limit jurisdiction to conduct occurring within the state's territory. 173 Therefore, it may be
said that a country may assert jurisdiction over the sale of stolen
cultural property outside its territory where neither party to the
sale is a national of the state asserting jurisdiction. 174
166. European Archaeological Convention, supra note 2, art. 7.
167. World Heritage Convention, supra note 2, art. 5; UNESCO Convention, supra note
l, art. 5.
168. OAS Convention, supra note 2, art. 7.
169. 1954 Hague Convention, supra note 2, art. 3.
170. Convention on the Law of the Sea, supra note 3, art. 149. This article may create
a conflict of law in that frequently more than one state will have one of the interests mentioned in the provision. The article provides no guidelines on resolution of such a conflict.
171. 1954 Hague Convention, supra note 2, art. 3.
172. Id. art. 28.
173. RESTATEMENT, supra note 4, § 18.
174. Id. Note that§ 18(b) of the RESTATEMENT requires the effect within the territory
to be substantial. The question remains whether such a sale would constitute an effect
substantial enough to confer jurisdiction. However, the case of the Afo-A-Kom of Cameroon
suggests that transactions in cultural property may often be sufficiently substantial. The
Afo-A-Kom is a wood carving said to represent the soul of the people of Cameroon. The
disappearance of the statue in 1966 meant that an integral part of an intrinsically superstitious
people's spiritual life was gone. When the piece appeared in a New York art gallery, a formal request from the Cameroon government, supplemented by adverse public opinion,
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However, use of the subjective-objective theory of territorial
jurisdiction immediately creates a conflict of jurisdictions problem.
The state wherein the effect of the proscribed conduct occurred
would have objective territorial jurisdiction. The state in which the
actual conduct took place would have subjective territorial jurisdiction. Both states might have an equal interest in prosecuting the
case, but the 1954 Hague Convention provides no basis on which
to determine which state might have priority of jurisdiction or how
to balance the interests of the states in order to confer jurisdiction. It should be noted that the jurisdictional provisions in the 1954
Hague Convention leave the prosecution and punishment of offenders to be provided for in the national criminal codes of the
respective states.
Further, the convention does not explicitly recognize the fact
that in time of war jurisdiction may be asserted by military courts
or tribunals, or national courts; 175 perhaps it was deemed too obvious. The most common forum for the prosecution of individuals
for war crimes is the military tribunal, either established internationally on the basis of universal jurisdiction or under the national
laws of individual states, or the ordinary criminal courts. 176
The most favored view of jurisdiction over war crimes is that,
as far as possible, national courts should adjudicate all war crimes
coming within their respective territorial jurisdiction, 177 but allowing for the universality theory to apply so that in the event a given
state fails to exercise its primary right of prosecution and punishment, another interested state could exercise jurisdiction. Certain
categories of offenses should, however, be remitted to an international criminal court either because they are international crimes
resulted in the return of the object to the government of Cameroon. DESKBOOK, supra note
6, at 71.
175. After World War II, actions for the recovery of property were instituted both
in the military courts set up by the occupying allies and the national courts, with considerable
confusion concerning authority to assert jurisdiction. See supra note 59.
176. This does not include the jurisdiction asserted by military tribunals. Court martials are limited to prosecution of persons currently in the armed forces and derive jurisdiction
from the sovereign right of nations to raise and administer armies. See U .C.M.J., supra note
14, 10 U.S.C. § 102, § 2802 art. 2 (1982).
177. Witness, for example, the problems of the United States in prosecuting exservicemen for crimes committP.d during the Korean and Viet Nam wars. See Note Jurisdictional Problems Related to Prosecution of Former Servicemen for Violations of the Law of War,
56 VA. L. REV. 947 (1970); Shaneyfelt, War Crimes and the Jurisdictional Maze, 4 INT'L LAW.
924 (1970). One author has proposed a theory under which war crimes jurisdiction may be
maintained in federal court. See Paust, After My Lai: The Case of War Crimes Jurisdiction
Over Civilians in Federal District Courts, 50 TEX. L. REV. 6 (1971). See also supra note 14.
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or because as transnational crimes they are more adequately and
effectively dealt with by such a court. This is especially true when,
for example, no national court has jurisdiction or when a state
chooses not to exercise jurisdiction, or because the crime committed has an effect in more than one state or against the citizens of
different states, or when the crime is committed by a head of state.178
In order for national courts to exercise common judicial jurisdiction under their general criminal laws, the provisions of the relevant international conventions must first be incorporated into
national penal codes. In the context of armed conflicts regulations,
however, the provisions prohibiting destruction or confiscation of
cultural property are subject to military law and are not subject
to the jurisdiction of the ordinary criminal courts. 179
Where jurisdiction cannot be asserted by a national court,
states may resort to special military tribunals. In the end, however,
both fora are limited by the general or special criminal jurisdiction of the special military courts of the individual states. Thus,
the convention is shortsighted in failing to provide alternative or
contingent jurisdictional bases by which its provisions may be
enforced.
Finally, the convention fails to address jurisdiction over
recovery and restitution of property through civil actions after
cessation of hostilities. Significant problems lie in determining title
once property has been confiscated and sold to bona fide third party purchasers. Without even a statement of policy regarding this
issue, the convention leaves the individual states to provide their
own solution.
The 1970 UNESCO Convention 180 sets forth three means by
which illicit traffic in cultural property may be controlled. First,
the parties are to set up national services. As appropriate for each

178. Historical Survey of the Question of International Criminal Jurisdiction, Report
by the Int'l L. Comm. to the Secretary-General, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/7. (May 27, 1949). See B.
FERENCZ, AN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A STEP TOWARD WORLD PEACE (1980). For a draft
statute creating an international criminal court for the enforcement of the Apartheid Convention containing specific jurisdictional provisions, see U .N. Commission on Human Rights,
The Establishment of an International Criminal Court for the Implementation of the Apartheid Convention and Other Relevant International Instruments, E/CN.4/AC/22CRP.10/Rev.1
(Dec. 10, 1980), reprinted in 9 HOFSTRA L. REV. 523 (1981).
179. See supra note 176. See also Baxter, Jurisdiction Over War Crimes and Crimes
Against Humanity: Individual and State Accountability, in II M.C. BASSIOUNI & V.P. NANDA, A TREATISE ON INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 67 (1973).
180. UNESCO Convention, supra note 1.
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country, such services would include development of draft legislation to protect the cultural heritage and prevent illicit export and
transfer of ownership of cultural property, and the establishment
of ethical principles to guide transactions in cultural property .181
Second, consistent with national legislation, the states are to prevent the import and acquisition of illegally exported cultural property from its eountry of origin. 182 Third, states are to prohibit the
export of cultural property from their territory unless accompanied
by an export certificate. 183 The convention provides for the imposition of penalties or administrative sanctions for violations of articles
6(b) or 7(b), but otherwise generally provides only for the parties
to oppose practices prohibited by the convention "within the means
at their disposal." 184 A duty is imposed, as consistent with the laws
of each state, to admit actions for recovery brought by the rightful
owners of cultural property. 185
It is very clear that the UNESCO Convention speaks exclusively of territoriality of jurisdiction. As mentioned above, the term
"jurisdiction" in international law refers to two aspects of the
authoritative decision-making process: rule-making and
rule-enforcing. 186 States are competent to declare conduct violative
of their interests and, therefore, punish all offenses committed
within their territory. The question is whether the two aspects of
jurisdiction must co-exist concurrently within a state.
The UNESCO Convention appears to vest the power to
legislate concerning protection of cultural property in the individual
state (rule-making); however, the convention does not clearly vest
the power to enforce in any state (rule-enforcing). Even if not expressly stated, the result is at least an implicit conflict between
the power of rule-making and the power of rule-enforcing. It is interesting to note that with respect to the United States-Mexico
treaty and enforcement thereof in recent decisions by the Fifth and
Ninth Circuits, 187 the U.S. Courts of Appeal have, in effect, interpreted the treaty to vest the power to legislate in the country of
origin of the cultural property, while the right of ownership is to
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.

arts. 5(a), 5(e).
art. 7.
art. 6.
art. 2(2).
art. 13(b).
RESTATEMENT, supra note 4, § 7.
See supra note 105.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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be enforced in the territory in which the object is located or in which
the prohibited act was committed. 188
Last, but not least, is the important, but overlooked, fact that
most states will not enforce the penal judgments of another state 189
unl~ss a convention specifically establishes that duty .190 The absence
of a clear statement in the relevant peacetime conventions on the
recognition and enforcement of penal judgments renders the enforceability of these judgments questionable and, thus, reduces
the impact of the convention with respect to the prevention, suppression and control of the activity sought to be internationally
prohibited.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The distinction made between relevant international instruments in their applicability to the contexts of war and peace
is inappropriate to the effective enforcement of a common interest,
based on the shared values and expectations of the world community
which are presumably embodied in all these instruments. The consequences of this distinction are that certain violations are deemed
international crimes while others are not specifically deemed to be
so. The legal distinction, in turn, produces significant differences
with respect to enforcement, and that in large part, is reflected in
the jurisdictional bases set forth explicitly or implicitly in these
instruments. These instruments are either too limited or too ambiguous regarding their intended enforcement. This is evidenced
by the criminal jurisdictional problems discussed above.
A consequence of this situation is the diversity of eventually
competent jurisdictions (i.e., an international criminal court, national
military tribunals, national criminal or civil courts). Another consequence appears in the enforcement schemes, means, and methods
188. See supra note 102. 'I'he McClain courts asserted a Mexican law as the basis for
establishing that the property in question was stolen within the meaning of the National
Stolen Property Act. See also King of Italy v. Marquis de Medici, 34 T.L.R. 632 (1918), wherein
the English court gave extraterritorial effect to an Italian law protecting the Italian
patrimony.
189. See The Antelope, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat) 66 (1825); but see Cooley v. Weinberger, 518
F.2d 1151 (10th Cir. 1975) and Von Mehren, Enforcement of Foreign Penal Judgments in the
United States, 17 VA. J. INT'L L. 401 (1977). See also Bassiouni, Perspectives on the Transfer of
Prisoners Between the U.S. a,nd Mexico and the U.S. and Canada, 11 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L
L. 249 (1978); Paust, The Unconstitutional Detention of Prisoners by the U.S. under the Exchange of Prisoner Treaties, in INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS OF CRIMINAL LAW: ENFORCING THE U.S.
LAW IN THE WORLD COMMUNITY (R.B. Lillich ed. 1981).
190. Bassiouni, The Penal Characteristics of Conventional International Criminal Law,
15 CASE
RES. J. INT'L L. 27 (1983).

w.
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(i.e., duty to prosecute or extradite, and lend judicial assistance and
cooperation). Finally, a difference also exists with respect to prosecutable offenses and offenders in these differing contexts before
multiple potentially competent fora.
In light of the observations made above, which are by no means
exhaustive, the following recommendations are offered:
(1) The adoption of a comprehensive unified convention dealing with all aspects and types of protection of cultural property,
irrespective of context. It should contain an appropriate differentiation between types of offenses, their definition (with a view to
preserving the principles of legality embodied in the maxim nulla
poere sine lege191 ), a statement of other able jurisdictional bases, with
a priority ranking to settle conflicts of judicial jurisdiction, and provisions providing for the duty to prosecute or extradite and the
establishment of a duty to lend judicial assistance and cooperation
in the investigation, prosecution, and enforcement of the provisions
of the convention and enforcement of the judgments of competent
tribunals, including recognition of foreign penal judgments. 192
(2) The drafting of model national legislation to implement such
a convention for inclusion into the national laws of the interested
states. This would provide greater uniformity of application and
enhance enforcement. 193
Almost all of the twenty-o~e recorded civilizations of this planet
have had some form of cultural property the heritage or legacy of
which has been received and transmitted for the enrichment of ensuing civilizations, and the enlightenment of succeeding generations.
Yet curiously that which appears most commonly shared through
191. M.C. BASSIOUNI, SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LA w 52 (1978), cited by the Supreme Court
in Kolender v. Lawson, 51 U.S.L.W. 4532, 4533 (1983).
192. See, e.g., European Convention on the International Validity of Criminal Judgments,
May 29, 1970, Europ.T.S. 70. See also EUROPEAN COMMITTEE ON CRIME PROBLEMS, COUNCIL OF
EUROPE, EXPLANATORY REPORT OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON THE INTERNATIONAL VALIDITY
OF CRIMINAL JUDGMENTS (1970); Harari, McLean & Silverwood, Reciprocal Enforcement of
Criminal Judgments, 45 REVUE INTERNATIONALE DE DROIT PENAL 585; Shearer, Recognition
and Enforcement of Foreign Criminal Judgments, 47 AUST. L.J. 585 (1973); Breukelaar, La
Reconaissance des Jugements Repressifs Etrangers, 45 REVUE INTERNATIONALE DE DROIT PENAL
565 (1974); Oehler, Recognition of Foreign Penal Judgments and Their Enforcement, in II M.C.
BASSIOUNI & V.P. NANDA, A TREATISE ON INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 261 (1973).
193. This recommendation was attempted in connection with the enforcement of the
Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs (1961), 18 U.S.T. 1407, T.l.A.S. 6298, 520 U.N.T.S. 151
(effective June 24, 1967), and the Convention on Psychotropic Substances, done Feb. 21, 1971,
U.N. Doc. E/CONF.58/6, T.l.A.S. 9725 (effective July 15, 1980), reprinted in 10 l.L.M. 261
(1971), and was included in workpaper: International Drug Control, Abidaja World Conference
on World Peace Through Law, Aug. 26, 1973. See also Bassiouni, The International Narcotics
Control System: A Proposal, 46 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 713 (1972).
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the ages in all parts of the globe, and that which is universally
perceived as deserving the highest protection seems to have been
the object of so little effective concern by the world community.
Perhaps it is as the cynics of the post-Napoleonic period argued
after the Paris Conference of 1815, that if such treasures belong
to the world and thus need to be preserved, why not keep them
in Paris where so many more people from many parts of the world
are likely to see and enjoy them? Perhaps it is because that which
is of perservable value to some, is of attractive, sometimes destructible, appeal to others. But perhaps, too, the realization that our
planet is the "spaceship-earth" is what it takes to bring about a
true sharing of the values of protecting and preserving the cultural
heritage of all peoples, not only for purely national or chauvinistic
purposes, but for the inherent interest that we all share in each
other's culture, now and for ensuing generations of this, and perhaps
succeeding civilizations, if our planet survives the test of our
destructive tendencies.

APPENDIX
M. Cherif Bassiouni, DRAFT INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL CODE
Presented to the Vlth U .N. Congress on Crime Prevention
and the Treatment of Offenders, (Caracas, Venezuela, 1980)
U.N. Doc. No. E/1980/L.l

Article XVII. Theft of National and Archaeological Treasures
Section 1. Definition
1.1 Cultural property is any property which, on religious or
secular grounds, is designated by a state as being of importance to
its cultural heritage and which belongs to the following categories:
(a) rare collections and specimens of fauna, flora, minerals
and anatomy, and objects of paleontological interest;
(b) property relating to history, including the history of
science and technology and military and social history, to the life
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of national leaders, thinkers, scientists, and artists, and to events
of national importance;
(c) products of archaeological excavations (including regular
and clandestine) or of archaeological discoveries;
(d) elements of artistic or historical monuments or archaeological sites which have been dismembered;
(e) antiquities more than one hundred years old, such as inscriptions, coins, and engraved seals;
(f) objects of ethnological interest;
(g) property of artistic interest, including, but not limited to:
(i) pictures, paintings and drawings produced entirely
by hand on any support and in any material (excluding industrial designs and manufactured articles decorated by hand);
(ii) original works of statutary art and sculpture in any
material;
(iii) original engravings, prints, and lithographs;
(iv) original artistic assemblages and montages in any
material;
(h) rare manuscripts and incunabula, old books, documents,
and publications of special interest, singly or in collections;
(i) postage, revenue, and similar stamps, singly or in
collections;
(j) archives, including sound, photographic and
cinematographic archives;
(k) articles of furniture more than one hundred years old and
old musical instruments.

1.2 Property which belongs to the following categories shall
be deemed part of the cultural heritage of a state:
(a) cultural property created by the individual or collective
genius of nationals of the state concerned, and cultural property
of importance to the state concerned created within the territory
of that state by foreign nationals or stateless persons resident
within such t,erritory;
(b) cultural property found within the national territory of
a state;
(c) cultural property acquired by archaeological, ethnological
or natural science missions, with the consent of the competent
authorities of the state of origin of such property;
(d) cultural property which has been the subject of a freely
agreed exchange;
(e) cultural property received as a gift or purchased legally
with the consent of the competent authorities of the state of origin
of such property.
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Section 2. Acts of Theft ofNational and Archaeological Treasures
2.0
sist of:

Theft of national and archaeological treasures shall con-

(a) the import, export, or transfer of ownership of cultural
property effected contrary to the provisions adopted by a state
to promote the enforcement of this Article;
(b) the export and transfer of cultural property under compulsion arising directly or indirectly from the occupation of a state
by a foreign power;
(c) the importation of cultural property stolen from a
museum or a religious or secular public monument or similar institution of a state, provided that such property is documented as
appertaining to the inventory of that institution.

Section 3. Recovery
3.0 Recovery of cultural property shall only be by those lawful
means provided for in international conventions on this subject and
any other relevant convention, but such recovery shall not be
deemed a seizure and just compensation shall be owed to the bona
fide holder.
Section 4. Specified Measures of Enforcement
4.1 Each exporting state shall establish an appropriate certificate which would specify that the export of the cultural property in question is authorized by that state. The certificate should
accompany all items of cultural property exported in accordance
with this Section.
Section 2. Each state shall prohibit exportation of cultural property from their territory unless accompanied by the export certificate mentioned in Section 4.1.
4.3 Each state shall publicize by appropriate means the requirements of this Section, particularly to those persons or entities
likely to engage in the import or export of cultural property.
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